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MICHAEL P. SENG*

The Cairo Experience: Civil Rights
Litigation in a Racial Powder Keg
At the junction of the two rivers, on ground so flat and low
and marshy, that at certain seasons of the year it is inundated
to the house-tops, lies a breeding place of fever, ague, and
death ....

C

A dismal swamp, on which the half-built houses

rot away ...a hotbed of disease, an ugly sepulchre, a grave
uncheered by any gleam of promise: a place without one
single quality, in earth
or air or water, to commend it: such
1
is the dismal Cairo.

AIRO is situated at the confluence of the Mississippi and Ohio
Rivers, at the southern tip of Illinois. It is 400 miles south of
Chicago and 160 miles north of Memphis. During the late 1960s and
early 1970s, Cairo was the scene of some of the worst racial hostility
2
and violence this country has known.
In 1969, the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law opened
* Assoc. Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. A.B. (1964); LL.B.

(1967), Univ. of Notre Dame. The author served as the directing attorney of the
Cairo legal services office from 1972 to 1976. He was legal counsel in most of the
cases discussed in this Article. Thus, much of the material herein relates to matters
in which he was personally involved or about which he has first-hand knowledge.
1 C. DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES 185 (1842).
2 In 1967, Robert L. Hunts, Jr., a black passenger in an automobile stopped by
Cairo police for having a defective tail-light, was arrested for being verbally
abusive. He was later found hanged in the city jail. Three days of disorder followed. At a coroner's inquest held two months after the incident his death was
ruled a suicide.
In 1968, Reverend Larry Potts, a white segregationist Baptist minister, clubbed
a 73-year-old black man to death. A coroner's jury absolved Potts, who contended
that the man had attempted to rape Potts' wife.
Cairo's white community responded to black disorder by organizing a group
known as the "White Hats." Its 600 members were deputized by the sheriff and
patrolled the town to keep order. SPECIAL HOUSE COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE
ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THE COUNTY OF ALEXANDER AND THE CITY OF CAIRO
APPOINTED PURSUANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTION No. 118, PRELIMINARY REPORT

(1969) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT 118]. The White Hats were disbanded
in 1969 under pressure from the Illinois Attorney General. This step was taken
because under Illinois law a sheriff has no authority to maintain a standing force
of special deputies. Carpenter's Union v. Citizens' Comm., 244 Ill. App. 540 (1927).
The United Citizens for Community Action (UCCA), an affiliate of the White
Citizens' Council, was formed as a successor organization.
[285]
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an office in Cairo. The Lawyer's Committee channeled the concerns of
Cairo's black citizens from the streets into the courts. This use of litigation to combat racism and violence has not been entirely successful, but
it has established the framework for an ongoing dialogue as an alternative to street fighting.
This Article outlines the history of Cairo and describes what happened when the civil rights lawyers came to town.3 Drawing from litigation aimed at securing and protecting the right to protest, 4 nondiscriminatory law enforcement, 5 equal employment,0 fair housing,7 and political representation,8 this Article illustrates the essential role of federal
courts in the civil rights arena. These examples highlight the need for
both accessibility to the federal courts and the availability of independent legal service organizations to give effect to civil rights.
I
THE HISTORICAL SETTING
Cairo's founders and promoters had great hopes for the city.9 Cairo
3 Civil rights lawyers were not always well-received. Not long after the author
first went to Cairo to litigate civil rights problems, he traveled to a small rural
community to represent a number of students who had been suspended from the
local high school for failure to get haircuts. The federal court ordered the students
reinstated. Copeland v. Hawkins, 352 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Ill. 1973). A local
newspaper commented:
A new creature has appeared on the horizon. He is a much feared
and by many, a much hated sort. Yet, he is a product of our times. We
call him the "civil rights lawyer."
This is the villan [sic] who defeats our local lawyers and our laws
at their own game. He comes to town with a bundle of tricks and seemingly limitless time and efforts to make things go his way. He is the one
who wins the court cases on technicalities. He is the one who puts children back in school and sues the school for trying to tell the youth how
he should groom his hair. He is the one who is always a thorn in the
side of the usual operation of our governmental system.
Editorial,The Gazette-Democrat (Anna, Ill.), Feb. 15, 1973, at 2, col. 1.
4 See notes 22-35 and accompanying text infra.
5 See notes 36-64 and accompanying text infra.
6 See notes 65-90 and accompanying text infra.
7 See notes 91-105 and accompanying text infra.
s See notes 106-131 and accompanying text infra.
9 The early history of Cairo is chronicled by John M. Lansden in J. LANSDEN,
A HIsToRY OF THE CrrY OF CAIRO, ILLINOIS (1910, reprinted S.I.U. 1976).
John Lansden went to Cairo in 1865 after graduating from law school. He
founded a law firm that continued until 1977 under his son and two grandsons.
The Lansden family was destined to play a crucial role in the civil rights struggle
of Cairo blacks. Lansden's son successfully argued People v. Nellis, 249 Ill. 12,
94 N.E. 165 (1911), before the Illinois Supreme Court. See note 36 infra. His
grandson, David, was local counsel on the equal pay for teachers and school desegregation cases of the 1940s and 1950s. See notes 15-17 infra. His other grand-
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was first established in 1818 as a business trust by a group of eastern
merchants. The trust failed and the town was transferred in 1836 to the
Cairo City and Canal Company. Throughout this period, the fortunes
of the city were closely tied to those of the Illinois Central Railroad. In
1846, the city properties were again transferred to the Cairo City Property Trust, and Cairo continued to be administered as a strictly proprietary venture. Private lots were not sold in the city until 1853, and a
civil government was not formed until 1855. Despite the more pretentious claims of its promotors, Cairo was a town of "cardsharps, pickpockets, pimps and prostitutes" 10 until Governor Adlai Stevenson put
an end to gambling in the city in the late 1940s.
Cairo is situated at the confluence of two important waterways, at
almost the exact geographical center of the United States. Nevertheless,
the town was never to meet its promoters' expectations. Cairo reached
its peak population, about 15,000 persons, in 1920; since then it has
slumped into decay. Today its population is about 6,000. At the time of
the racial disturbances described in this Article, Cairo had the lowest
per capita income, the highest rate of unemployment, and the poorest
housing of any municipality in Illinois."'
In order to prosper, Cairo had to protect itself from the flood conditions so graphically described by Charles Dickens. The city constructed
levees to keep out flood waters, but seepage problems remained. It was
not unusual for underground water to shoot up from land enclosed by
the levees. Though the seepage problems were solved to some extent by
landfill, even today sinkholes form under the city, causing portions of
streets and buildings suddenly to subside into the mud beneath. Above
all, the floods contribute to a sense of isolation. During floodtimes,
Cairo becomes a virtual island linked to the outside world by a single
highly-banked highway. Because of the lowness of the land, at floodtime
one can stand on Eighth Street and see, over the Ohio levees, barges, or
perhaps the Delta Queen, pass by on churning muddy waters eight to
ten feet above street level. At these times Cairo is indeed a dismal
swamp.
The problems of poverty and isolation in Cairo are exacerbated by
12
rampant racism. Cairo has always been a self-styled "southern town.'
son, Robert, was instrumental in bringing the Lawyer's Committee to Cairo in
1969, and served as co-counsel on many of the Committee's lawsuits.
10 Lukas, Bad Day at Cairo, Ill., N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1971, § 6 (Magazine),

at 79.
11 HousE REPORT 118, s-upranote 2.
12 A sign at the entrance to the city ironically proclaims that Cairo is "Where
Southern Hospitality Meets Northern Enterprise."
In 1910, John Lansden wrote: "Cairo is a southern city, not only geographically but racially. In the latter respect, it is not much more likely to change than
in the former." J. LANSDEN, supra note 9, at 146.
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The racial climate in Cairo during pre-Civil War days was shaped by
the slave-owning states of Kentucky and Missouri, between which it is
wedged. The underground railroad bypassed Cairo, and natives liked
to boast that the climate was not suitable for abolitionists.' 3
In 1860, Cairo had a population of 2,188, of whom only fifty-five
were black. This quickly changed when General Ulysses S. Grant established his headquarters in Cairo in 1861. Since 1870, when the city's
population had grown to 6,267, Cairo's black population has hovered
close to forty percent.
Private housing in Cairo, as in most of the South, never has been
completely segregated, although virtually everything else was. 14 An
additional factor contributing to the polarization of the races in Cairo
has been the almost complete fencing out of the black race from the
political process. In 1913, Cairo adopted a commission form of government, with city commissioners elected at-large. During the next fifty
years, although blacks represented almost forty percent of the population, no black was elected to a city office. Furthermore, blacks were
almost totally excluded from any of the appointed boards and commissions in the city and county.
II
THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS

The first major push for racial equality occurred in 1946 when black
teachers filed suit in federal court to secure equal pay.15 Later, in 1952,
Is Unpublished research by Fred Bernstein of Cairo, Illinois from comments
in the 1854 Cairo Times.
14 Both public and private facilities were segregated. Cairo's schools were operated on a dual basis until 1953, see note 16 infra, and its black schools remained
exclusively black until 1967. Cairo's public housing was segregated until 1976. St.
Mary's Park was segregated until 1962. Seating in the courthouse was segregated
until 1963. Almost all public and private offices employed only whites. The municipal swimming pool was closed in 1963 to avoid integration. Places of public accommodation remained segregated until 1962. The Catholic Diocese maintained segregated parishes in Cairo until the late 1960s.
15 Negro City Teachers Ass'n v. Schultz, Civ. No. 968 (E.D. Ill. 1946).
The equal pay case was argued by Thurgood Marshall. Ms. Hattie Kendrick,
one of the named plaintiffs, enjoys telling how during the hearing the judge and
defense counsel continuously referred to Marshall as a "boy." Defense counsel
explained to the court how a comparable case in Tennessee had been handled by
a distinguished attorney who knew what he was doing, unlike the "boy" in this
case. Defense counsel continued to wax eloquent about the brilliance of the lawyer
in the other case. Marshall quietly stood up and thanked counsel for the compliments, then informed the court that he was the brilliant attorney who had handled
the Tennessee case. The courtroom exploded with laughter and defense counsel
was silent thereafter.
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efforts were begun to integrate Cairo's schools, 16 but separate black
schools were not finally abolished until 1967.17
16 The State of Illinois had conducted hearings on Cairo's segregated schools

in 1951 pursuant to H.R. REs. 34 (1951), 1 ILL. HouSE J. 101 (Jan. 1951).
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
met with the school board on January 15, 1952, and it was agreed that 23 black students would be admitted to white schools. This agreement produced a wave of violence by the white community. The home of a black dentist was fired upon and the
home of a black physician was bombed. Bernstein, Let My People Go, E. St. Louis
Monitor, Mar. 1, 1973, at 6, col. 1. On February 7, eight members of the NAACP,
including their attorney, David Lansden, were arrested and charged with "conspiring to cause or permit children to be placed in such a situation that their lives
and health were endangered in that they did feloniously force children to attend
school." Id. This matter, together with charges arising out of the bombing incident, was referred to a grand jury; no true bills were returned. Id., Mar. 8, 1973,
at 6, col. 1. Thereafter, attorney Lansden was ostracized by the white community;
he and his family were threatened, and rocks and garbage were thrown at his
house. Id., June 7, 1973, at 6, col. 1. Lansden's neighbors erected a flashing neon
sign with an arrow pointing to the Lansden home to ensure that these acts of
terrorism were not misdirected. Id., May 3, 1973, at 6, col. 2.
17 Although Cairo's public schools were integrated without a lawsuit, see note
16 supra, education issues formed a major part of the civil rights caseload of both
the Lawyer's Committee and its successor, the Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance
Foundation. In the years immediately following the integration of the Cairo
schools, black students complained of discriminatory harassment, intimidation,
and punishment. On February 12, 1970, over 50 black Cairo students filed a complaint with the Illinois Superintendent of Public Instruction concerning discrimination by local school officials. The superintendent earlier had refused to schedule
a hearing in Cairo on the complaints because of the violence in the community.
Students filed suit to require him to come to Cairo to investigate their charges.
Complaint, Ewing v. Page, Civ. No. 70-20 (E.D. Ill. filed Feb. 12, 1970). The
suit was later dismissed when the superintendent's successor agreed to hold hearings in Cairo.
In 1969, local white leaders organized a private school, which they dubbed
"Camelot," to avoid integration. In 1973, the Civil Rights Commission criticized
the Internal Revenue Service for granting Camelot tax exempt status. P. GOOD,
CAIRO, ILLINOIS: RACISM AT FLOODTIDE 19 (U.S. Comm'n for Civil Rights 1973).
In 1976, Cairo blacks joined plaintiffs from other communities in a suit against
the Secretary of Treasury to prevent him from granting tax exemptions to private
schools formed to avoid integration. Wright v. Simon, Civ. No. 76-1426 (D.D.C.
filed July 30, 1976). The district court dismissed the complaint, but the court of
appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue. Wright v. Regan,
656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See Note, The IRS, Discrimination,and Religious
Schools: Does the Revised Proposed Revenue Procedure Exact Too High a
Price?, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 141 (1980).
On January 8, 1982, the Reagan administration announced that it was reversing
an li-year-old policy and would begin granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools. After a storm of protest, the White House reversed
its position only four days later; it announced that it would seek legislation denying tax exemptions to schools that discriminated. More than half the lawyers in
the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department signed a protest statement,
arguing that to grant tax exempt status to discriminatory private schools "vio-
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In 1969, the black community launched a boycott of local merchants
to protest employment discrimination.' Effects of the boycott were
quickly felt, but the white community remained intransigent. Any possible hope for moderation disappeared in 1971, when members of the
United Citizens for Community Action (UCCA), an affiliate of the
White Citizens' Council, gained control of the city council. 19 During
this period there were some thirty-seven fires of suspicious origin and
over 140 days of shooting. It appeared that the white community would
suffer bankruptcy or even total annihilation of the town rather than
try to come to terms with the black community.
It was during this period that the Lawyer's Committee opened an
office in Cairo.2 0 The Committee located itself in the library of the
Lansden and Lansden law firm and quickly became a target for white
hostility.2 1 Nonetheless the Committee proceeded to funnel blacks'

grievances into the federal courts, and both sides gradually stopped
shooting and awaited the results.
A. Protectingthe Right to Protest
On March 31, 1969, the Cairo United Front started its boycott of
lates existing federal civil rights laws as expressed in the Constitution, Acts of
Congress, and federal court interpretations thereof." Chicago Tribune, Feb. 3,
1982, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
18 The boycott was organized by the Cairo United Front, under the leadership
of the Reverend Charles Koen. The United Front's goal was to open up 88 jobs
for blacks.
19 The UCCA was the successor organization to the White Hats. See note 2
supra.
20 In 1963, President Kennedy called a meeting at the White House to ask the
legal profession to help secure civil rights for blacks. The response was the organization of the Lawyer's Committee; offices were opened in Jackson, Mississippi
and later in various cities around the country. The Lawyer's Committee opened
its Cairo office in 1969. Shortly after the office was opened it applied for and
received federal funding from the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). In
August 1972, the Cairo office was merged with other OEO funded legal services
offices in downstate Illinois into the Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation.
The Cairo office was the only rural project ever attempted by the Lawyer's
Committee. The large distance from any major metropolitan area and the relatively low salaries available to pay the lawyers have made it difficult to hire attorneys. Both before and after the merger with the Legal Assistance Foundation,
therefore, the Cairo office relied heavily on support from Chicago attorneys.
Although the office had a general strategy to eliminate all forms of officially
imposed discrimination in Cairo and to remedy private discrimination to the
extent possible, it would be wrong to assume that the office followed any particular
blueprint in filing cases. Most often lawsuits were filed in response to particularly
egregious events or because of pressures from the client community to remedy
matters of particular concern at the moment.
21 On one occasion six sticks of dynamite were thrown into the office; fortunately, the fuse was defective. The office was a target for gunfire; a bullet fired
into the office struck and dented a photocopier. In 1971, the UCCA organized a
campaign to pressure the governor to halt OEO funding. This effort failed.
HeinOnline -- 61 Or. L. Rev. 290 1982
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white merchants to end employment discrimination. In addition to the
boycott, the Front regularly picketed business establishments along
Commercial Avenue and held solidarity rallies and protest marches on
Saturday afternoons. These activities were opposed by both city and
state law enforcement authorities, as well as by local merchants. 22 It is
not surprising, therefore, that the first suits filed by the Lawyer's Committee in Cairo were to secure the rights of blacks to air their grievances.
On September 11, 1969, Mayor Stenzel proclaimed that a civil emergency existed in Cairo and issued the following notice:
1. Effective immediately all gatherings of people of two or
more individuals is prohibited.
2. It is further ordered that no person shall take part in or
become a part of a parade or engage in picketing within the
corporate limits of the City of Cairo.
3. No person shall loiter in and upon any public street within
the corporate limits of the City of Cairo ....
Members of the Front were arrested and charged with violating this
proclamation and two city ordinances barring peaceful picketing and
assemblies in the city. 23 The Lawyer's Committee filed suit in United
24
States District Court and secured a temporary restraining order
25
against the enforcement of these measures.
During the week of September 29, 1969, Preston Ewing, Jr., an
organizer for the Front, gave notice to the city and to state officials
that a nonviolent parade would take place on October 4. The parade was
to proceed from the Front headquarters to the business district on
Commercial Avenue. Ewing informed state and city officials that the
parade route would include a four block portion of Washington Avenue,
a state highway. He was told that if the marchers either crossed or
traveled on Washington Avenue they would be arrested. 26 The Front
22 On at least one occasion Cairo merchants went to Mississippi to talk with
merchants about the possibility of filing a civil aamage action against the boycotters. Such an action had resulted in an award of $1.2 million to Mississippi
merchants. See Claiborne Hardware, Inc. v. NAACP, 393 S.2d 1290 (Miss. Ch.
Ct. 1976). Cairo merchants, however, never filed such an action.
23 The first ordinance prohibited parades in Cairo without a permit from the
Commissioner of Streets and Public Improvements. Cairo, Ill., Ordinance 511
(Aug. 12, 1963). The second ordinance authorized the mayor to declare a state of
civil emergency and to issue various orders pursuant thereto. Cairo, Ill., Ordinance
601 (June 26, 1969).
24 Ewing v. City of Cairo, Civ. No. 69-150-D (E.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1969) (order
temporarily restraining enforcement of the ordinances). On January 5, 1970, the
court's order was made permanent.
25 The court declared that the proclamation and ordinances violated the United
States Constitution, and enjoined the city from proceeding with the prosecutions.
Id. (E.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 1970) (order granting permanent injunction).
26 State and city law enforcement authorities relied upon ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
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decided to hold the march anyway. As the marchers approached Washington Avenue, they were met by all eighteen Cairo police officers and
approximately 100 state troopers. When marchers ignored an order to
disperse, troopers began chasing the demonstrators, many of whom
were women and children. This free-for-all ended with the arrest of
27
about twenty-five persons on charges of obstructing a public highway.
Not deterred by this confrontation, the Front scheduled another
march for the following week and notified city and state officials that
they intended to use the same parade route as on October 4. The Lawyer's Committee filed suit in federal court to enjoin the prosecution of
the October 4 marchers and to prevent official interference with future
parades. 28 On the morning of the second march, both sides appeared
before federal Judge William G. Juergens; the judge entered an order
allowing the marchers to parade two abreast along the previously designated route. 29 The order further provided that "the police shall provide
the same reasonable protections to the marchers in the future as they
have in the past" and that plaintiffs should give written notice to the
Cairo Police Department "at least three and one-half hours prior to the
beginning time of said marches or parades." 30
By agreement in 1971, the preliminary injunction entered in 1969
was made permanent with the modification that plaintiffs give twentyfour hours notice in advance of any march as required by Illinois statute,3 1 instead of the three and one-half hour notice requirement of the
1969 order. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the agreed order
121, § 4-408 (1965) and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 85.1 (Smith-Hurd 1967). Section 4-408 authorized the State Department of Public Works to permit local government agencies to close traffic temporarily on portions of state highways. Section
85.1 prohibited marches or assemblies on any roadway without a permit. Notice of
such a march had to be given to the proper law enforcement authorities at least
24 hours before the march was to begin. The section also limited the hours when
such a march could take place.
The chief of police had told Ewing that he could have a permit, and indeed did
have permission to march anywhere in the streets of Cairo so long as the marchers
did not go onto the state highway.
27 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95-1/2, § 197 (1965).
28 Koen v. Thomas, Civ. No. 69-139 (E.D. Ill.
Aug. 30, 1969). The suit asked
that ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 85.1 (Smith-Hurd 1967), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95-

1/2, § 197 (1965), and id. ch. 121, § 4-408 be declared unconstitutional.
29 Koen v. Thomas, Civ. No. 69-139 (E.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 1970). This order was
telephoned to Cairo just as the marchers were about 1000 feet from Washington
Avenue, where a contingent of about 150 state troopers and the entire Cairo police
force awaited them. Another confrontation was averted.
30 Id. After the order was hammered out, the city attorney expressed concern
about returning to Cairo with a second order permitting blacks to demonstrate.
It was therefore agreed that the order should end with a clause that it "should not
be construed as a victory for any of the parties thereto." Id.
31 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 85.5 (1967).
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was proper in all respects except that the district judge should have
scheduled a hearing to determine the validity of the twenty-four hour
notice requirement.82 Finally, in December 1973, District Judge Henry
S. Wise ruled that 'six hours notice would give the city sufficient time
to provide protection to the marchers. 33 Neither side appealed this
order.
Peaceful demonstrations in Cairo offered an effective alternative to
violence.8 4 Most disturbances occurred only when city or state officials
tried to interfere with the demonstrators.8" In fact, on more than one
occasion, blacks peacefully picketed to end racial discrimination as
members of the American Nazi party or other similar groups demonstrated in favor of white supremacy. The boycott and demonstrations,
which continued for several years, drew broad attention to Cairo's racial injustices and provided an effective "safety-valve" to release racial
82 The court of appeals held that because of the important first amendment
principles involved, the district court should have resolved the notice requirement
only after a hearing. The court noted that "[a]s an appropriate starting point for
the hearing, defendants should be prepared to demonstrate why the [three and onehalf] hours' notice requirement of the temporary restraining order should be
lengthened." Order, Koen v. Thomas, No. 72-1805 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 1973).
88 Koen v. Thomas, Civ. No. 69-139 (E.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 1973). The court did
not find the Illinois 24-hour notice statute unconstitutional on its face, but only
that it could not be applied constitutionally in Cairo. Once again Cairo was shown
to be unique in relation to the rest of the state.
84 Judge Wise's final order in December 1973 referred to testimony by Preston
Ewing, Jr. that parades were conducted in Cairo not only to demonstrate racial
injustices, but also to serve as a "safety-valve," or emotional release, for members
of the black community when racial incidents created severe tension. Id. at 4. The
court expressly recognized that a notice requirement of more than six hours could
frustrate this latter purpose. Id.
Because most racial incidents in Cairo occurred at night, and because of the
prohibitions against night marches in the court's previous order, Judge Wise
recognized that a demonstration might not be allowed to take place under the 24hour notice provision until two days after the incident. The judge concluded that
six hours would give the authorities sufficient time to organize, but it would not
be so long as to frustrate the purpose of the march, because it enabled marches
to be conducted on the same day an incident occurred.
35 On November 20, 1970, the Cairo City Council passed an ordinance requiring
pickets to remain 10 feet apart, and further requiring that no more than two
pickets be within a 20 foot radius of the entrance of any premises being picketed.
The ordinance covered not only pickets, but also anyone else "stationed" or
"posted" by a building to induce others not to enter, or to observe those who
entered or patronized the same. Cairo, Ill. Ordinance 630 (Nov. 20, 1970).
On Saturday, December 5, 1970, about 30 peaceful pickets in Cairo's downtown
area were arrested by approximately 10 police officers and 40 special deputies
wearing helmets and carrying guns and night sticks. A shot was fired, and the
police proceeded to club and beat the pickets. Twelve members of the Front, including some who had been merely observing the pickets, were arrested and held
in the city jail. Police confiscated the cameras of reporters on the scene of the
confrontation, and later refused to allow lawyers to see those arrested.
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tension. More importantly, they provided a daily reminder to Cairo
citizens that their city had not yet come to terms with its racial problems.
B. Enforcing the Law Against the Law Enforcers
Between 1969 and 1972, shootings and arson were almost daily occurrences in Cairo. Violence and lawlessness86 were not the exclusive
province of private individuals-they permeated each and every aspect
of the law enforcement and justice agencies in Cairo. Both the sheriff of
Alexander County and the state's attorney were organizers of the
White Hats.3 7 In 1969, a special Illinois House Legislative Committee
recommended that a special prosecutor be appointed to investigate the
inability of Cairo officials to keep the peace. 8 8 In 1970, the Cairo Police
Department was described in a special survey conducted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police as "ill-trained" and lacking in
"the necessary leadership to accomplish its mission."3 9 The report concluded that citizens had little faith in the department, and that members
of the department were insensitive to the racial conditions confronting
them. 40 In 1973, the United States Commission on Civil Rights recommended that the Illinois General Assembly pass legislation allowing
state officials to take over local law enforcement functions in Cairo because local officials had failed to protect the rights of citizens. 4 1 None
of these recommendations was adopted.
Not only did Cairo police officers fail to protect the rights of citizens,
36 Cairo's penchant for violence and lawlessness was not of recent origin. On
November 11, 1909, William James, a black man, was lynched for the alleged
murder of a young white woman. The sheriff of Alexander County had tried to
protect James by taking him to a nearby town but a mob intercepted them, took
James from the sheriff's custody, and brought James back to Cairo, where he was
lynched. After hanging James the mob shot him, and dragged his body to the
scene of the crime. A week later the Illinois Governor declared the office of Alexander County Sheriff vacant on the ground that the sheriff had not done all in his
power to prevent the lynching. The Governor's action was taken pursuant to ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 25-2(b) (1965)
under which the lynching of a person in
custody is prima facie evidence of a sheriff's failure to perform his duty. The
Governor's actions were affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v.
Nellis, 249 Ill. 12, 94 N.E. 165 (1911).
In 1967, the national guard was called to Cairo as a result of disorders following the hanging of James Hunt. See note 2 supra.
87 See note 2 supra.
38 HouSE REPORT 118, supra note 2, at 8.
89 Field Operations Div., Internat'l Assoc. of Chiefs of Police, Survey of the
Police Dept., Cairo, Illinois (Aug. 1970).
Under Cairo's commission form of government each city commissioner had
exclusive authority over a specific city department. Thus an untrained city commissioner supervised the police department.
40 Id. In late 1969 the city turned down a $75,000 grant to improve policecommunity relations. See P. GOOD,supra note 17, at 26-35.
41 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CAIRO, ILLINOIS: A SYMBOL OF RAcIAL
POLARIZATION

(1973)

[hereinafter cited as

RAcIAL POLARIZATION].
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they engaged in many acts of police brutality. 42 There was also some
evidence that they contributed to the nightly acts of violence which
rocked the community. The angle of the over forty bullets fired into St.
Columba's church and rectory, the headquarters of the Front, located
directly across from the police station, indicated48that they had been fired
from the cupola at the top of the police station.
In 1970, the state police were called to permanent duty in Cairo. From
50 to 150 state police officers were assigned to Cairo each week. Although the black community initially had respect for the state police, it
was not long before the state police were perceived as an occupational
army which supported the white power structure. 44 On January 21, and
again on February 12, 1971, the state police, together with the city
police department and the sheriff's office, conducted raids of Plymouth
Court, the segregated, low-income housing project where thirty-five
percent of Cairo's black population was housed. The officers, wearing
riot-gear, surrounded the project while squads of officers broke down
doors and conducted systematic searches of various apartments. The
warrants under which the officers purported to act were later held
legally insufficient by the county circuit court. The Lawyer's Committee
subsequently filed a civil suit for damages against the officers. The state
agreed to settle the case in 1975 by making awards and returning seized
45
items to the plaintiffs.
Racism permeated every level of the criminal justice system in
Cairo. 46 One of the first activities of the Lawyer's Committee was to
42 Police brutality was alleged in both Koen v. Thomas, Civ. No. 69-139 (E.D.
Ill. amended complaint filed Aug. 3, 1970) and Whitfield v. Reineking, Civ. No.
71-126-D (E.D. Ill. filed July 21, 1971). Whites, as well as blacks, were the
victims of police brutality. See, e.g., Joiner v. Cairo, Civ. No. 78-2073-B (E.D.
Ill. Aug. 24, 1978); Harget v. Roach, No. 73-6-23 (Cir. Ct. Alexander County,
July 25, 1973).
43 No charges were ever filed as a result of this or any other incidents of gunfire in Cairo against blacks or civil rights workers.
44 The state police remained in Cairo through 1971. At that time the Illinois
State Police had virtually no black officers.
When the author left Chicago in 1972 to drive to his new job with the Lawyer's
Committee in Cairo, he was stopped on 1-57 for a minor traffic violation just south
of Champaign, Illinois and about 250 miles north of Cairo. The officer asked the
author where he was moving and when he heard the name "Cairo" he began to
curse the place, stating that he had been assigned there for several weeks the
previous year.
45 Whitfield v. Reineking, Civ. No. 71-126-D (E.D. Ill. filed July 21, 1971).
46 In 1969, an independent public defender's office was established in Cairo
under the auspices of the Illinois Defender Project, with funds from the Illinois
Law Enforcement Commission. By giving those accused of crimes a vigorous
defense, the office helped to change the one-sided approach to criminal justice that
formerly had prevailed in the county. The office continued until 1975, when the
influence of local officials succeeded in establishing a locally controlled defender
program.
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halt all jury trials in Alexander County until a jury list fairly representing the county's racial composition was compiled. This was the only
important victory achieved in Cairo without extensive litigation. The
first two trials conducted with blacks seated on the juries resulted in
acquittals for the defendants. Although Cairo's mayor issued a statement condemning these results, and a local newspaper 47 printed the
names of all the jurors in an article critical of them, the state's attorney
was thereafter induced to dismiss a number of frivolous prosecutions. 4
In July 1970, a suit was brought in federal court to attack the unequal
administration of justice in Cairo. 49 The suit arose after a number of
demonstrators were injured when a white man drove his truck into
them. The state's attorney refused to allow the injured to sign a complaint against the driver, thus prompting the federal suit.
The complaint in Littleton v. Berbling50 alleged that State's Attorney
Peyton Berbling, was an organizer and officer of the White Hats, and
that he had conducted his office so as to deny plaintiffs equal rights. 51
Specifically the complaint alleged that Berbling and his investigator
willfully and maliciously refused to initiate criminal prosecutions
against white persons upon the complaints of blacks, and listed seven
instances involving the named plaintiffs to support this charge. The
plaintiffs also asserted that Berbling prosecuted blacks for offenses no
white person would ever be prosecuted for, and that he requested higher
bonds 52 and sentences for blacks than for whites. The police commissioner and police chief were accused of harassing civil rights demonstrators by arresting them and charging them with crimes unwarranted by
the facts. Two judges, Michael O'Shea and Dorothy Spomer, were
accused of participating in unlawful measures aimed at discouraging
the demonstrators, by illegally setting bail, by imposing heavier sentences against blacks, and by requiring blacks to pay the cost of jury
trials. 55 The suit requested an injunction ordering the defendants to
47 The Tri-State Informer, a local newspaper sympathetic to the UCCA.
48 More recently, Alexander County jurors have shown a reluctance to convict
where there is evidence of police brutality. In 1977, Michael Joiner, a young white
man, was charged with resisting a police officer. Evidence was presented that he
had been beaten by the police and refused permission to talk to his attorney. A
biracial jury found him not guilty. The city later agreed to pay him damages.
Joiner v. Cairo, Civ. No. 78-2073-B (E.D. Ill. filed Aug. 24, 1978).
49 Littleton v. Berbling, Civ. No. 70-103 (E.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 1971).
50 Id.
51 The complaint was premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
52 Even if criminal charges later are dismissed, Illinois law authorizes the
clerk to keep 10% of the bail to cover administrative expenses. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 110-7(f) (1965).
53 The prosecutions against the civil rights demonstrators were similar to those
used in the early 1960s to harass civil rights workers in the South. See Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecution Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Fed-
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cease and desist from these illegal practices."
The Illinois Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of
the judges, claiming they were immune from suit for their judicial acts.
The state's attorney appeared through private counsel, and filed a similar motion, claiming that he was immune from suit and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The district court dismissed the
complaints against Berbling, his investigator, and O'Shea and Spomer.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court, holding that the defendants were not immune from suit, and that
if, after trial, the allegations against the defendants were shown to be
true, a proper order could be fashioned to correct the abuses. 5 The
United States Supreme Court reversed; in a remarkable opinion the
Court held that the plaintiffs' controversy was not ripe for adjudication.5" The Court did not hold that the judges were immune from suit,
but did note that equitable considerations would generally preclude any
relief against them. 57 While the case was proceeding to the Supreme
eral Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113
U. PA. L. REv. 793 (1965).
54 The suit also requested damages against Berbling and his investigator. The
suit was filed prior to Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), which established that prosecutors could not be sued for damages. No damages were sought
against the judges because of the prior Supreme Court decision in Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967), holding judges immune from damages. See also Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judge will not be deprived of immunity because
the action complained of was taken in error, was malicious, or was in excess of
authority, but will be deprived of immunity when he or she has acted in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction).
55 Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub noma. O'Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
56 O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). The court noted: "[A]ttempting to
anticipate whether and when these respondents will be charged with crime and
will be made to appear before either petitioner takes us into the area of speculation
and conjecture." Id. at 497. Neither party had raised the ripeness issue before;
Justice Douglas, in dissent, noted:
This is a more pervasive scheme for suppression of blacks and their
civil rights than I have ever seen. It may not survive trial. But if this
case does not present a "case or controversy" involving the named
plaintiffs, then that concept has been so watered down as to be no longer
recognizable. This will please the white superstructure, but it does violence to the conception of evenhanded justice envisioned by the Constitution.
Id. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Of course, had the plaintiffs waited until actions were pending against them,
they would have run squarely into Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal
courts will not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and
immediate).
57 414 U.S. at 499. The Court later held that judges in their enforcement capacity were proper defendants in suits for declaratory and injunctive relief. Supreme
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Court, Peyton Berbling retired as state's attorney and was succeeded
by W.C. Spomer. 5 The Supreme Court remanded the case against
State's Attorney Spomer to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether
the plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaint to include
claims for relief against him, or whether the action was moot. 59
The Littleton litigation can best be seen as a final cry of frustration
by the black community. The plaintiffs had nowhere to turn; they
viewed law enforcement authorities as part of a scheme to frustrate
their rights. 60 Although the Illinois Attorney General has the duty to
defend state officials who are sued in civil suits, he also has a duty to
protect the civil rights of Illinois citizens. 6' Littleton demonstrated
which duty he considered paramount. Not only did the state rush to the
aid of the judges, but so did the Illinois Bar Association and the Illinois
Judges Association. The defendants and their supporters pressed the
Court v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980). Cf. Lyons v. City of Los
Angeles, 615 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 934 (1980) (plaintiff
who sought to enjoin the city of Los Angeles and four police officers from pursuing policy of using strangleholds in non-life-threatening situations held to have
stated a case or controversy within the jurisdiction of the federal courts).
58 Spomer, Berbling's former law partner and the husband of Circuit Judge
Dorothy Spomer, had been Cairo's corporation counsel in 1969. That year the
House Investigating Committee had noted that it could appear to outsiders that
Cairo was run by a small, closed group of prosperous whites who were closely
related by blood and business ties. HOUSE REPORT 118, supra note 2. While the
committee stated that the situation was not unusual for a small town and that
there was no conflict of interest in the technical sense, it did give the appearance
to blacks of a solid white wall of authority unsympathetic to their problems. Id.
59 Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974). On remand, the plaintiffs informed
the court of appeals that they did not wish to name State's Attorney Spomer as an
additional party because he did not appear to be continuing the practices alleged
against his predecessor. The injunctive claim against the state's attorney was
therefore dismissed. Spomer v. Littleton, Civ. No. 71-1395 (7th Cir. Jan. 29, 1975)
(order dismissing claim).
60 Supreme Court dicta noting that plaintiffs had remedies other than injunctive relief did not comport with reality. State and federal officials showed a remarkable indifference to the problems in Cairo, and when they did intervene it
was generally to the detriment to Cairo's blacks. See RACIAL POLARIZATION, supra
note 41. The change of venue "remedy" discussed by the Court, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. at 502, would not have solved the problems associated with defending
wrongful prosecutions and having to post bond to secure one's freedom while the
case was pending. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
61 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 14, § 9 (1965)
creates a civil rights division in the
Illinois Attorney General's office. The Attorney General is charged with preventing discrimination and investigating civil right's violations, and is further authorized to take all steps necessary to enforce Illinois civil rights laws. Id. It is a
criminal offense, as well as grounds for removal from office, for any Illinois
official to deny or refuse any person equal services because of his race. Id. ch. 38,
§ 13(2) (d). This provision imposes a duty on the Attorney General to investigate
and prosecute those who violate the statute.

HeinOnline -- 61 Or. L. Rev. 298 1982

Cairo Experience

broadest argument-that state judges are immune from federal injunctions even if they violate federal civil rights laws.62 The fact that Cairo's
black citizens were not getting a "fair shake" out of the justice system
did not matter.
Although the plaintiffs lost in the Supreme Court, the Littleton litigation was not without its effect in Cairo. It certainly raised the consciousness of the defendants and their successors in office, and at least while
the suit was pending, and in its immediate aftermath, justice was administered more even-handedly. But the long range impact of the litigation is more difficult to assess. If similar abuses take place in the future,
the Supreme Court's opinion will make it extremely difficult, if not
virtually impossible, for the victims of such misconduct to get relief
from the federal courts.6
Cairo exemplified a social structure in which racism and lawlessness
permeated every institution, including law enforcement and justice. Yet
the victims of this system have been left without a systematic way to
deal with the problem should it recur, other than to defend individual
criminal prosecutions and now and then to file a police brutality suit.64
62 Indeed, the attorneys representing the defendants were so intent on establishing a broad precedent that during oral argument before the Supreme Court,

the attorney representing W.C. Spomer, fearing the Court might find the action
moot, asserted that his client would follow the same illegal practices alleged
against his predecessor. Even the Court found this assertion "somewhat extraordinary" and stated in its opinion that it would consider only those assertions
pressed by the plaintiffs. Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514, 522 n.10 (1974).
63 Furthermore, any attorney who decides to sue a judge in the Illinois courts
does so at his own risk. After the Supreme Court decided Littleton, the public
defender for Alexander County, in the course of representing a client, filed suit
against the circuit judge in state court. The suit claimed the judge had illegally
denied the client bail. The attorney was cited for contempt, and although the
contempt citation was initially reversed by the Illinois Appellate Court, People
ex rel Kunce v. Hogan, 37 Ill. App. 3d 673, 346 N.E.2d 456 (5th Dist. 1976), the
Illinois Supreme Court reinstated it on the ground that suing a judge on the basis
of a proceeding still pending before him is contemptuous per se. People ex rel
Kunce v. Hogan, 67 Ill. 2d 55, 364 N.E.2d 50 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1023
(1978).
64 Remedies are available today that were not available at the time of the
Supreme Court's decision in Littleton. Municipalities are no longer immune from
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Owen v. City of Independence, 446 U.S. 993
(1980) ; Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
The City of Cairo recently was unsuccessful in its motion to have the city dismissed as a defendant in a police brutality case, Joiner v. City of Cairo, Civ. No.
78-2073-B (E.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 1979), and ended up settling with the plaintiff.
However, the requirement imposed by the United States Supreme Court that the
civil rights deprivation result from official policies or customs of the city still
makes recovery difficult. See Seng, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct, 51
Miss. L.J. 1 (1980). In its 1973 Cairo report, the U.S. Commission for Civil
Rights had recommended that Congress abrogate municipal immunity under 42
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So long as effective legal remedies were available, blacks in Cairo were
willing to defer to them, but the Cairo experience also indicates that
persons will not suffer abuse indefinitely, and that if effective legal
remedies are not available, they will vent their frustration in less socially desirable ways.
C. Securing Equal Employment
It is idle to argue whether Cairo's racial problems stemmed from its
economic problems or whether its economic problems stemmed from its
racial problems. The two were inseparable and each aggravated the
other. Neither could be solved in isolation; in toto, however, the problems were too immense for any local agency to deal with. Civil rights
litigation helped to provide blacks with equal access to a few jobs in the
community, but in itself litigation cannot reverse the economic stagna65
tion that has plagued the community throughout most of its existence.
In 1970, Cairo ranked first in poverty in Illinois. Some thirty percent
of its population received welfare assistance. 6 At least in part as a
result of longstanding discrimination in the community, blacks continue
U.S.C. § 1983. RACIAL POLARIZATION, supra note 41, at 18.
New provisions in Illinois law may provide additional remedies against public
officers who practice racial discrimination. The Illinois Human Rights Act, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101-9 to -102 (Smith-Hurd 1980), gives the Human
Rights Commission authority over state and local government officials who deny
persons "the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of the Official's office or services or of any property under the
official's care because of unlawful discrimination." Id. § 5-102(C). Upon proof
of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, the commission may award
affirmative relief as well as damages, id. § 8-108, and may recommend that public
officials be disciplined or discharged, id. § 8-109. It is too early to predict whether
this statute wil be enforced strictly, but Illinois' past record does not give much
cause for optimism.
65 For at least the past 30 years, Cairo has faced a declining population. It has
little industry and virtually no growing businesses. The E.L. Bruce Company,
the last large manufacturer of hardwood flooring, closed its doors in Cairo in
February 1971. The Burkhart Company, which makes seat padding, is the largest
employer in Cairo. The number of its employees fluctuates, however, and many
of its employees live in the surrounding states.
The prospect for better employment in the future does not look encouraging.
Cairo needs more unskilled jobs in the private sector, and these do not appear to
be forthcoming. In 1976, city fathers heralded a bright future when Bunge Corporation located a large grain elevator complex in Cairo. The project occupies
much of the limited waterfront property in the city. However, the plant as constructed is fully automated and the people of Cairo have received virtually no
jobs in return.
Economic growth in a city such as Cairo can be measured only by the number
of jobs created for local residents. Until Cairo officials recognize that economic
progress must benefit the entire community, neither Cairo's economic status, nor
the status of Cairo's black community, is likely to improve.
66 RACIAL POLARIZATION, supra note 41, at 6.
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to be disproportionately represented on the welfare rolls. The white
67
community's resentment over this contributes to racial antagonism.
A large number of poor whites, many from the bordering states, compete with blacks for the few jobs available in Cairo, and this further
contributes to racial strife. 6 The 1969 Illinois House reported that
"[t]he atmosphere in which black children grow up in Cairo is one of
dependency and hopelessness." 69 As with so many small communities,
the ablest of Cairo's young citizens grow up, graduate from school, and
move away.
The boycott begun by the Cairo United Front identified equal employment as it major objective. 70 The Lawyer's Committee and its
successor Legal Assistance Foundation 71 had a constant caseload of employment discrimination charges before the Illinois Fair Employment
Practices Commission (F.E.P.C.), 72 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.), and the courts. Gradually blacks gained
employment in the banks and offices about town. Because most businesses in town are small, owner-operated enterprises with few employees, however, downtown Cairo is still virtually all-white.
In 1969, employment discrimination suits were filed against the
Alexander County Housing Authority 73 and the Cairo Public Utility
Commission.7 4 The Alexander County Housing Authority operated
public housing in the county on a segregated basis. 75 When suit was
filed, only three of the Authority's seventeen employees were black. One
of these blacks, Brady Buckley, served as a management aid for Pyramid Court, the all-black family project, and for Butler Homes, an allblack project for the elderly, but he had no authority in any of the white
projects. The other two black employees served as custodians. The suit
against the Housing Authority was settled in 1974. At that time, five
of the Authority's sixteen employees were black. It was agreed that a
black person would be hired to fill the position of Leasing and Occupancy Clerk, that Brady Buckley would be given expanded administra67 See HousE REPORT 118, supra note 2.
68
69

See id.
Id.

70 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
71 See note 20 supra.
72 The FEPC has been succeeded by the Illinois Human Rights Commission.
See note 64 supra.
73 Amended Complaint, Young v. Alexander County Ilous. Auth. Civ. No.
69-157 (E.D. Ill. filed May 11, 1970).
74 Amended Verified Complaint, Hollis v. Emerson, Civ. No. 69-146 (E.D.
Ill. filed Jan. 23, 1970).
75 See text accompanying notes 95-96 infra.
76 Consent Order, Young v. Alexander County Hous. Auth. Civ. No. 69-157
(E.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1974). The order also provided for the projects to be integrated,
and for the appointment of blacks to the Housing Commission.
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tive responsibilities, and that black workers would be considered in the
76
future as supervisory employees.
After the consent decree was entered, the Federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development (H.U.D.) provided funds to the
Housing Authority to modernize its two formerly segregated multifamily projects. The Authority proceeded to award contracts without
consideration of any employment opportunities for the tenants. The
tenants of Pyramid Court refused to allow the contractor into the project until representatives from H.U.D. came to Paducah, Kentucky, to
meet with the tenants, the Housing Authority, and the contractor. The
parties agreed that tenants would be given priority in hiring. As a result, a number of tenants were admitted into the local construction
unions and had employment at least during the period that the modernization work continued. The tenants also organized a not-for-profit construction company and subcontracted to do some of the modernization
work.
The Cairo Public Utility Commission was a municipally owned utility. In 1969, the Commission employed approximately twenty-five persons; all were white except one man who worked as a groundskeeper.
Many of the Commission's employees were skilled workers hired
through union apprentice programs. The office workers were required
to pass an unvalidated pre-employment test. Most of the Commission's
employees had been employed by it for more than twenty years, and
turnover was rare. However, by 1976, the Commission had hired three
blacks. A consent decree entered that year provided that the next office
employee hired would be black, and that thereafter one of the next two
office employees hired would also be black. 77 The Commission abandoned its pre-employment test and agreed actively to recruit a black to
78
fill an existing vacancy for an apprentice operator in the sewage plant.
The police department was the city agency most visible to blacks, and
also the agency that caused the most friction with the black community.
In 1969, the department was criticized by the International Association
of Police Chiefs for its insensitivity to the black community.7 9 In 1970,
two of the city's three black officers resigned because of the adverse conditions for blacks on the force.80
Police officers were appointed by a three person Board of Fire and
Police Commissioners. In May 1969, Julius Oats, a black, filed an application with the Board to take the police examination. He passed both
77 Consent Order, Hollis v. Emerson, Civ. No. 69-146 (E.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1976).
The order also provided for the appointment of a black to the Cairo Public
Utility Commission.
78 See id.
T9 See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
80

See P. GooD, supra note 17, at 31.
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the oral and written examinations and was placed on the eligibility list.
In August 1969, he was informed that his name was being removed
from the eligibility list because an F.B.I. check had revealed that he was
once charged with being a deserter from the United States Army, and
that a disorderly conduct charge had been filed against him in 1968 in
Chicago. Oats had not been convicted of either offense. 8'
The Lawyer's Committee filed charges of racial discrimination on
his behalf before the Illinois F.E.P.C. A hearing examiner recommended the complaint be dismissed, but the Commission reversed and
ordered the city to offer Oats employment and to pay him back wages.
The city filed a complaint for administrative review before the Circuit
Court of Alexander County, and that court reversed the Commission
because there was no evidence that the city used a different standard for
blacks than for whites. Oats and the F.E.P.C. appealed to the Illinois
Appellate Court, which reversed the circuit court in 1974.82 The appellate court held that the city's policy of excluding persons from employment because of their arrest records constituted illegal race discrimination regardless of the city's lack of a discriminatory motive or the evenness of application of the policy. The court relied on E.E.O.C. rulings
and F.B.I. statistics in concluding that arrest record hiring criteria have
an inherently discriminatory impact upon black job applicants. The city
filed a motion for rehearing, but before the court ruled on the motion,
the city agreed to pay Oats $12,500 to cover his back pay. 83
In 1973, the city had approximately 130 employees, but only twelve
were black, and of these, ten were street or garbage workers. About
ninety-six percent of the city's payroll and annual expenses went to
whites, and only four percent to blacks. 8 4 The police department had
seventeen officers, of whom two were black. The city had thirteen
firefighters, but it had never hired a black in the fire department. 85
Prompted by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 6 the
E.E.O.C. launched an investigation of Cairo's employment practices in
1973. In 1974, it returned charges against the city,8 7 and an attempt at
conciliation was commenced. In December 1975, a number of Cairo
81 Indeed it was revealed later that the Army had routinely charged Oats with
desertion when they more properly should have charged him with being absent
without leave; the Army discharged Oats "under honorable circumstances."
82 City of Cairo v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 21 Ill. App. 3d 358,
315 N.E.2d 344 (5th Dist. 1974).
83 At that time Oats no longer desired employment as a Cairo police officer.
84 ILLINOIS ADV. COMM. TO U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, A DECADE OF WAITING IN CAIRO 9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as A DECADE OF WAITING].
85 In 1971, the city had turned down a Department of Labor grant of $137,000
under a program, called "Public Service Careers," designed to train and upgrade
city employees. See P. GooD, supra note 17, at 67.
86 RACIAL POLARIZATION, Supra note 41, at 24.
87 E.E.O.C. Charge No. TCH4C-0241.
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blacks, fearing that the E.E.O.C. was not effectively representing their
interests, asked for permission to intervene in the conciliation process.
This petition was never acted upon. In February 1976, the city agreed
to maintain a seventeen percent black workforce. The fire department
would employ two blacks and the police department three.88
The lawsuits and economic pressures brought to bear on the white
community by blacks did produce some jobs for Cairo's black citizens.
In 1972, most public offices in the area were still white.89 Under pressure, such agencies as Public Aid, the Department of Children and
Family Services, and the Mental Health Department added blacks to
their staffs, thus increasing their credibility in the black community. Although litigation helped to change the all-white complexion of many
offices, each case took years to complete, and even then the gains were
only modest. An equal employment strategy can succeed only if jobs
themselves exist, and in Cairo there were simply not enough jobs to go
around. 90
D. FacilitatingFairHousing

Perhaps the most outwardly depressing aspect of Cairo is its housing.
Despite a few postbellum mansions and some magnificent old magnolia
trees, the town in 1970 had the appearance of utter neglect and decay.
At least one-half of Cairo's housing was substandard and in need of
major repair. 9 1 Nearly every block of the city contained one or more
abandoned buildings-although it was sometimes difficult to differentiate which buildings were abandoned and which ones were still being
used to house families. Unpainted and unheated frame houses with
broken porches, windows, and doors were the rule and not the exception
in Cairo.
Between 1960 and 1972, fewer than a dozen new homes were constructed in Cairo. During hearings before the Civil Rights Commission
in 1972, then Mayor Walder testified that the city had no plans for
improving the housing situation.9 2 Not only did Cairo officials have no
88 The 17% figure accepted by the E.E.O.C. did not accord with the city's population, which was 38% black, or the county's population, which was 28% black.
The E.E.O.C. apparently accepted 17% as representative of the black workforce

in the county.

The city previously had employed three black police omcers in 1970, so there
was no real net gain in that department.
89 See P. GooD, supra note 17, at 66.
90 The limited usefulness of existing employment discrimination laws is discussed in D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 589-665 (2d ed. 1980).
91 A DECADE OF WAITING, supra note 84, at 18. Cairo ranked second in Illinois
in substandard housing units.
92 In the mid-1970s, Cairo did receive some funding to demolish some of the
abandoned buildings in the city. While the program helped to improve the appearance of the town, it did nothing to improve the substandard housing in which
persons actually lived.
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plans for improvement, they actually tried to block efforts to alleviate
the shortage of decent homes in the city.
In 1969, the State of Illinois made $5 million available to build new
housing in Cairo, and the biracial, not-for-profit Egyptian Housing
Development Corporation was formed to implement the project. Van
Ewing, the director of this corporation, appeared before the City Council on numerous occasions to ask the city to sell land on which the group
could build houses; each time the city refused. 93 The corporation was
able, however, to purchase other land, and between 1972 and 1976, constructed nearly 160 sorely needed homes for low-income Cairo resi94
dents.
Apart from a few exceptional older homes and the houses later constructed by the Egyptian Housing Development Corporation, the best
housing in Cairo for low-income persons was the public housing administered by the County Housing Authority. Cairo had two large
multi-family projects which had been built in the 1940s and several
smaller projects built for elderly persons. When the family projects
were built in the 1940s, the federal government directed that they be
segregated and specified different standards of quality for the white and
black projects.93 Pyramid Court, the black project, had approximately
237 units, and Elmwood Place, the white project, had 159. The Authority continued to operate these projects on a segregated basis even after
H.U.D. changed its policies in 1966 to specifically forbid segregation in
public housing. Neither H.U.D. nor the State of Illinois, whose laws
also forbade segregated public housing, intervened.9 6
In 1969, the Lawyer's Committee filed suit against the Authority to
end segregation in its various projects. 97 Four years later, the Justice
9s The city opposed the project, at least in part, because it was supported by
the United Front. See P. GOOD, supra note 17, at 62; A DECADE OF WAITING, supra
note 84, at 18.
The project provided not only homes, but also badly needed employment for
area craftsmen and laborers. It was projected that the new housing would result
in more than $37,500 in new property taxes every year and that the building program would circulate about $9,840,000 in new money throughout the local economy.
94 The homes were financed through long-term mortgages made available by
the Farmer's Home Administration.
95 It was ironic that public housing was segregated although most private
neighborhoods were not completely segregated. See A DECADE OF WAITING, supra
note 84, at 17.
96 In 1973, the U.S. Commission for Civil Rights severely castigated H.U.D.
for failing to take any steps to compel the Authority to comply with federal fair

housing laws and regulations.

RACIAL POLARIZATION,

supra note 41, at 25.

Amended Complaint, Young v. Alexander County Hous. Auth., Civ. No. 69157 (E.D. Ill. filed May 11, 1970). The suit also asked that the Authority be
required to hire blacks, that blacks be appointed to the five member Authority,
and that the Authority modify some of its admissions policies.
97
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Department filed its own suit to end the segregation.9" The two suits
were consolidated and a consent decree entered in October 1974. 99 The
decree forbade the Authority from segregating tenants on the basis of
race and required it to take some modest steps to integrate the projects. 100 Tenants were permitted to apply for a transfer to a project
where their race did not predominate. New applicants were placed in
projects where their race did not predominate, and if they refused, lost
their place on, and were moved to the end of, the waiting list. Elmwood
Place was to be considered integrated when it had thirty-nine black
tenants, and Pyramid Court when it had seventy-one white tenants. 01 '
Elmwood Place was integrated quickly and without incident; today it
appears to be a stable biracial community. At one time after the order
was signed, as many as ten white families resided in Pyramid Court;
10 2
today, however, only a handful remain.
The consent decree ended the Authority's official policy of segrega98 Complaint, United States v. Alexander County Hous. Auth., Civ. No. CV73-76D (E.D. Ill. filed Nov. 14, 1973).
99 Consent Decree, United States v. Alexander County Hous. Auth., Civ. No.
CV-73-76D (E.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1974).
100 Id.
In a separate consent decree of the same date, the Authority agreed with the
plaintiffs in the Young case to adopt various amendments to its admission policies.
Applicants were to receive written notice of their eligibility for housing and were
to be informed of their right to a hearing if they were found ineligible. A point
system was created to determine the priority of persons on the Authority's waiting list. Id. This decree did not end disputes over the Authority's admission procedures, however, and in 1978 the Legal Assistance Foundation again sued the
Authority. Amended Complaint, Ayers v. Shumaker, Civ. No. 78-2028B (E.D.
Ill. filed June 11, 1979). A consent decree issued in that case specified even more
detailed procedures to be used by the Authority in considering the applications
of prospective tenants. Consent Decree, Ayers v. Shumaker, Civ. No. 78-2028B
(E.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 1980).
101 The Authority's affirmative obligations were to cease when the requisite
number of minority tenants was reached in each of the projects, or in two years,
whichever came first. The Legal Assistance Foundation had suggested that the
order would be more effective if a I-.U D representative was assigned to Cairo
to help implement the order and to explain it to the residents. It was felt that this
would placate local fears better than the system of written notices specified in the
order. The Legal Assistance Foundation also suggested that the 50 vacant units
in Pyramid Court be rehabilitated immediately so that a block of white families
could be moved at once, rather than one at a time. These suggestions were not
accepted by the Justice Department.
102 Because Pyramid Court was the scene of many racial confrontations between 1969 and 1972, black and white families alike expressed reluctance to live
there. Shortly after the first white families moved into Pyramid Court, there were
several incidents in which all of the project's street lights were shot out.
At the expiration of the two-year period during which the Authority had an
affirmative obligation to integrate the housing projects, the Legal Assistance
Foundation, on behalf of the private plaintiffs in Young, asked that the order be
extended to allow more time to integrate Pyramid Court. The Justice Department
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tion on the basis of race. The effects of this policy had been more than
merely symbolic. The projects had not been maintained equally and
city services, especially police protection, had not been provided equally
to the area in which Pyramid Court was located. Hence the integration
order had the effect of directly raising the standard of living for many
black Cairo families.
Most importantly, the consent decree induced H.U.D. to grant the
Authority modernization funds to be used for badly needed repairs in
Pyramid Court and Elmwood Place, and for additional improvements
to Pyramid Court to make that project comparable to Elmwood Place.
However, the modernization program also opened up new areas of dispute between the tenants and the Authority. The tenants had formed a
union and under H.U.D. guidelines the Authority was to consult with
the union on all phases of the modernization program. This the Authority refused to do until the tenants of Pyramid Court blocked construction and forced H.U.D. to call a meeting between all concerned parties
to negotiate an agreement. After negotiation, the Authority agreed to
consult with the tenants on all policy questions and an affirmative action
program was adopted to give hiring preference to tenants for work done
in the projects.108
The most serious problem to arise from the modernization work concerned the future of the almost fifty units in Pyramid Court that the
Authority had allowed to sit vacant and which now were wholly uninhabitable. The Authority wanted to tear down eight buildings in Pyramid Court to alleviate overcrowding and to provide parking and recreational space for the project's residents. The tenants objected. Because
of the severe shortage of low income housing and the long waiting list
for public housing the tenants wished that the units be rehabilitated to
serve additional families. The Authority threatened to cease modernization work and return the remaining funds to H.U.D. unless some buildings were torn down to reduce the density of the project.1 0 4 H.U.D.
under
refused to intervene and eventually a compromise was reached
10
which all but four Pyramid Court buildings were refurbished.
refused to join the private plaintiffs in this request and the order was allowed to
expire.
103 See notes 73 & 75-76 and accompanying text supra.
104 Because the 50 vacant units were uninhabitable as they existed, if the modernization work had been stopped, no new units would have been made available
for those on the waiting list. Further, in light of the past history of local officials
turning down federal funds, see, e.g., notes 40 & 83 supra, it was conceivable that
the Authority would refuse funds to refurbish the projects.
105 The United Front vehemently objected to this compromise and hired its
own attorney to file suit in federal court to block the demolition. Chairs v. Alexander County Hous. Auth., Civ. No. CV-77-2048B (E.D. Ill. filed June 1, 1977).
Their request for an injunction was denied, and the project refurbishment eventually was completed according to the compromise terms.
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Especially since 1974, public housing matters have occupied a disproportionate amount of time for legal services attorneys in Cairo. Federal programs appear to be the only answer to Cairo's shortage of lowincome housing. The Lawyer's Committee and the Legal Assistance
Foundation tried to force those programs to conform to federal constitutional and statutory requirements. Litigation solved some problems, but the day-to-day monitoring of the system is never-ending.
Efforts to fully untangle the maze of conflicting policies operating on
the local and national levels, and housing problems, will no doubt continue to vex local attorneys for the immediate future.
E. EnsuringPoliticalRepresentation
Before the 1970s, blacks were noticeably under-represented in Cairo's
political process. Although they made up approximately forty percent
of the population, few blacks had been appointed to city and county
boards and commissions, 106 and no black had ever been elected to a city
office. Complete discretion in appointing board and commission representatives was, in part, responsible for the disproportionate representation. Cairo's commission form of government, with city commissioners
elected at-large, was also responsible. Four suits, filed between 1969
and 1973, helped ensure greater black representation in the political
process.
In Hollis v. Emerson,107 and Young v. Alexander County Housing
Authority, 0 8 both filed in 1969, the Lawyer's Committee requested the
district court to order the appointment of blacks to the Utilities Commission and Housing Authority in numbers proportionate to the percentage of blacks in the population. Ewing v. Walder,109 filed in 1972,
made a similar request respecting all remaining city and county boards
and commissions.
When the agreement to integrate the housing projects was reached in
1974,110 the attorney for the county agreed to a stipulation of fact on
the appointments count.1 ' Plaintiffs' attorney submitted a proposed
106 In 1969, an Illinois House of Representatives Special Committee recommended that blacks be appointed to city and county boards and commissions.
HousE REPORT 118, supra note 2, at 9. The United States Commission on Civil
Rights made a similar recommendation in 1973. RACIAL POLARIZATION, supra note
41, at 22.
107 Consent Order, Hollis v. Emerson, Civ. No. 69-146 (E.D. Ill. Feb. 10,
1976).
108 Consent Order, Young v. Alexander County Hous. Auth., Civ. No. 69-157
(E.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1974).
109 Consent Order, Ewing v. Walder, Civ. No. 72-119-D (E.D. Ill. Sept. 2,
1975).
110 See notes 97-100 and accompanying text supra.

111 The attorneys stipulated that blacks made up 38% of the Cairo population and 28% of the Alexander County population, and that blacks made up
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order to the district judge, who entered the order in October 1974.112
The order provided that the chairman of the Alexander County Board
and his successors in office would appoint and maintain a Housing
Authority with at least two black members. 113 The order also provided
that notice of all vacancies on the Authority would be publicized at least
forty-five days in advance and that interested persons could submit
names of possible appointees.
The ice was now broken and in August 1975, the county agreed to
settle Ewing v. Walder. The chairman of the County Board agreed in
a consent order that he and his successors would appoint a specified
number of blacks to each county commission. 114 The county also agreed
to public notice of vacancies so that interested persons could submit
their names for consideration.
The city initially refused to discuss a similar resolution until the
Ewing case was set for trial on September 2, 1975. The city then agreed
to a decree requiring appointment of a specified number of blacks to city
boards and commissions." 5
Hollis v. Emerson was resolved in February 1976. The city agreed
to an order that required the appointment of a black to the four member Public Utilities Commission and provided that all future appointments would be made so that at least one member of the commission
was black.' 16
62% of the public housing population, occupying 52% of the public housing units.
The attorneys also stipulated that until 1972 no black person had ever been appointed to the five member Housing Authority, although the percentage of blacks
who were qualified and willing to serve on the Authority mirrored their representation in the community.
112 Consent Order, United States v. Alexander County Hous. Auth., Civ. No.
CV 73-76D (E.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1974).
113 Id. See also notes 97-102 and accompanying text supra.
114 The order required the appointment of one black to the five member County
Building Commission, four blacks to the ten member County Welfare Commission, two blacks to the five member County Land Commission, one black to the
four member County Health Department, and one black to the five member Airport Commission. Consent Order, Ewing v. Walder, Civ. No. 72-119-D (E.D.
Ill. Aug. 13, 1975) (order settling the case only as to Alexander County).
115 The city agreed to appoint at least two blacks to the nine member library
board, one black to the five member Police Pension Board, one black to the three
member Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, and three blacks to the seven
member Board of Zoning Appeals. Consent Order, Ewing v. Walder, Civ. No.
72-119-D (E.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1975).
Unlike the order against the county, which provided that blacks would be appointed when the next vacancy occurred, the city promised to make all appointments within 30 days. Also unlike the order against the county, which bound the
present county board and its successors, the order against the city was binding
only until the next city election in April 1979. The district court retained jurisdiction over the case, noting that if future mayors and city councils failed to appoint
blacks in accordance with the order the matter would be advanced for trial.
116 Consent Order, Hollis v. Emerson, Civ. No. 69-146 (E.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1976).
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While these orders do not assure blacks a controlling vote on any of
the boards or commissions, they do provide blacks with a voice to help
shape future city and county policies. 1 17 The local newspaper praised
both the city and the county for compromising and for making new advances to achieve racial harmony in the community. 118
On November 5, 1973, six blacks, represented by the Legal Assistance Foundation, filed the suit of Kendrick v. Walder" 9 which sought
a declaration that the commission form of government in Cairo was
unconstitutional. Under this system, adopted in 1913,120 five city commissioners, each in charge of a specific city department, were elected
at-large. Before the commission form of government was adopted,
blacks had been elected to the City Council ;121 since 1913,122 however,
128
no black had been able to win an election to city office.
The complaint in Kendrick v. Wa.Ider alleged that Cairo was a racially polarized community and that under the at-large system of electing public officials Cairo's blacks were effectively fenced out of the political process. 12 4 The complaint detailed the history of segregation and
racial antagonism in the community. The plaintiffs asserted that black
candidates and voters had been unable to form political coalitions with
white candidates and voters, that black residents of Cairo shared a com117 In his memoirs, Justice William 0. Douglas expressed strong support for
black representation on local school boards. He noted that the school desegregation decrees approved by the Supreme Court were almost alhays administered by
all-white school boards, and stated that the Court should have directed lower
federal courts to approve only those school plans submitted by integrated school
boards. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975, at 149-50 (1980).
11' A Step Forward, Cairo Evening Citizen, Sept. 9, 1975, at 2, col. 1. The
newspaper queried why the national media did not cover Cairo when it took a
"step forward" by settling the lawsuit, when the national media had given extensive coverage to the racial strife in Cairo.
119 527 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1975).
120 The commission form of government is authorized by Illinois law. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 24, §§ 4-3-2 to -5 (1965).
121 From 1885 to 1901, there was always at least one black city councilman. J.

LANSDEN,

supra note 9.

When the commission form of government was adopted in 1913, local
political and press support was premised on the need to eliminate corruption in
city government. However, John Lansden commented in his 1910 history of Cairo
that Cairo blacks were "bought and sold at election times until the elective franchise in their hands seem[ed] to be a travesty." J. LANSDEN, supra note 9, at 146.
It is more likely, therefore, that the adoption of the commission form of government was intended to effectively disenfranchise Cairo's black voters. The commission form of government certainly ensured a future of "white man's elections"
in Cairo. Id. at 181.
123 In 1969, Norman Seavers, a black man, was appointed to fill a city council
vacancy.
124 Complaint, Kendrick v. Walder, Civ. No. CV-73-19-C (E.D. Ill. filed
Nov. 5,1973).
122
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munity of interest based upon race, poverty, and the legacy of racial
discrimination, and that the at-large voting system had furthered racial
discrimination in the community. The city moved to dismiss the complaint, and in January 1975, the district court held that the complaint
125
failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which reversed the district court and remanded the case
for trial. 126 The Seventh Circuit recognized that "the use of an at-large
system of voting, not in itself unfair to any individual voter, when imposed on a community with a history and legacy of discrimination
against an identifiable group may operate to deny that group an opportunity for effective participation in the electoral system."'1 27 The court
also noted that the adoption of the at-large system by a referendum vote
of the people of Cairo did not defeat plaintiffs' equal protection claim
because the citizens of Cairo could not, by majority vote, dilute the
128
plaintiffs' votes.
Five years later, in March 1980, the district court entered a consent
decree which abolished the at-large voting election system.129 The city
was divided into five wards, at least two of which are predominantly
black. Candidates must reside in the ward from which they are elected.
The order also allows for a sixth council member to be elected at-large.
Because the next election was not scheduled until April 1983, the order
also provided that a special election would be held to determine the
council members from the predominantly black second and third wards.
In November 1980, two blacks were elected to the City Council. 130
Ewing and Kendrick may well prove to be the most significant suits
filed in Cairo. They ensure that blacks will have at least some voice in
community decisions. While these cases cannot guarantee that discrimination will not occur in the future, they do guarantee that blacks
will have representatives within the political process to keep them informed. With a representative government at the core of our system,
125

Kendrick v. Walder, Civ. No. CV-73-19-C (E.D. I11.). rev'd, 527 F.2d 44

(7th Cir. 1975).
126 527 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1975).
127 Id. at 49.
128 Id. at 50-51.
129 Consent Order, Kendrick v. Walder, Civ. No. CV-73-19-C (E.D. Ill. Mar.
11, 1980).
130 Whether these orders would have been approved by the Supreme Court is
questionable. In Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S.
605 (1974), the Court evidenced reluctance to interfere with the discretionary
appointment of public officials. Id. at 618-29. Furthermore, just a few months
after the Kendrick settlement was approved, the Supreme Court held that federal
courts should not dismantle an at-large election system without proof that it was
"purposefully" adopted or maintained to discriminate on the basis of race. City
of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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effective political participation by minority groups must be protected. 181
Ewing and Kendrick probably offer the best guarantee against another
breakdown of law and order in Cairo.
III
THE LESSONS OF CAIRO

Whether it was protecting the right to protest or securing other civil
rights, the federal judiciary was the most effective referee of Cairo's
racial problems. No other court or agency had such broad jurisdiction
or power, nor commanded the necessary respect to ensure that its decisions would be implemented. The federal injunctions averted potentially
violent confrontations. Federal injunctive relief also effectively terminated a number of state court prosecutions under statutes and ordinances unconstitutional on their face or as applied. 132 The preliminary
orders in each of the protest cases filed by the Lawyer's Committee,
however, were entered before the Supreme Court decision in Younger
v. Harris.3 3 The Younger decision and its progeny, through abstention
principles, have effectively closed the lower federal courts to those seeking injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to pending state prosecutions. The Cairo experience calls into question the comity and federalism concerns that provide the doctrinal basis for Younger-type abstention. Had the federal judicial forum been closed, it is difficult to
131 John Hart Ely has demonstrated that "the duty of representation that lies
at the core of our system requires more than a voice and a vote." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135 (1980). He therefore
urges that "[t]o the extent that there is a stoppage, the system is malfunctioning,
and the Court should unblock it without caring how it got that way." Id. at 136.
132 Whether the state court would have accepted the demonstrators' constitutional arguments is at least questionable. The local prosecutor and judges, as
elected officials who lived in Cairo, were certainly subject to local pressures and
were closely tied to the local white power structure. See generally Amsterdam,
supra note 53. Federal judges were not subject to such pressures; they neither
resided nor held court in Cairo. As a practical matter, the local judges probably
were not completely unhappy to have the federal judges assume the burden of
deciding the validity of arrests and the constitutionality of particular statutes or
ordinances.
138 401 U.S.37 (1971).
At the time the Cairo orders were entered the controlling precedent in the area
of federal court injunctions against state criminal proceedings was Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). In Doinbrowski, the Court had held that federal
courts properly could enjoin certain state court prosecutions against civil rights
demonstrators. The efficacy of federal court proceedings was severely limited by
the Younger decision. The Younger Court held that equitable considerations, as
well as considerations of comity and federalism, prevented federal courts from
enjoining pending state court prosecutions unless the state proceedings constituted
bad faith harassment.
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imagine any acceptable end to the shootings and other violence that
were a regular occurrence in Cairo.
Most other Cairo cases, like the protest cases, were brought before
the Supreme Court's recent retrenchment in the civil rights area. Cairo's
at-large election system was dismantled just months before the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden.'34 Cairo's housing and
employment cases were settled just before the Court enunciated its view
that only "purposeful" discrimination is unlawful in these areas. a5
Despite the New Federalism, 3 6 the first lesson to be learned from
the Cairo lawsuits is that federal courts can play an important role in
solving racial problems; however, the federal courts must be open to
provide prompt and effective relief to civil rights litigants. This means
that the courts must take a liberal view of the standing of private litigants to initiate lawsuits.' 37 Private litigants must also be allowed to
intervene to protect their own interests in actions initiated by the government. The Cairo experience demonstrates that state and federal
officials are slow to act, and that when they do act, it is generally only
to achieve the most minimal concessions. Therefore, it is imperative
that Congress provide for, and that the courts recognize, the right of
litigants to initiate private actions under federal regulatory schemes' 3 8
and that mandamus or injunctive remedies be available against officials
who fail to perform their statutory or constitutional duties. x39 Courts
should be concerned more about the practical consequences of official
action and less about the subjective motivations of public officials. Cairo
blacks were effectively excluded from the political process regardless of
the subjective motivations of the voters who enacted the at-large voting
134 446 U.S. 55 (1980). See also note 130 supra.
135 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,

429 U.S. 252 (1977) ; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
136 See, e.g., O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between Federal and State
Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801
(1981).
137 Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that plaintiffs in some of the
Cairo cases might well have faced serious challenges to their standing to litigate
had their cases been brought today. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) ; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
For a discussion of ripeness problems, see note 56 supra.
13s The Supreme Court recently has expressed reluctance to recognize new
private rights of action under federal statutes. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) ; Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S.
560 (1979). See Note, Implied Causes of Action: A New Analytical Framework,
14 J. Mx. L. REV. 141 (1980). But see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.

677 (1979).
139 See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan. 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (claims
against federal compliance agencies fell within ultra vires exception to sovereign
immunity bar).
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system in 1913.140 For the courts to adhere to any other standard belies
reality. In addition, courts must be allowed broad discretion to fashion
effective decrees. Affirmative remedies must be available, and, even
more importantly, decrees must provide for ongoing checks and for
permanent structural changes when necessary to ensure that past illegal
practices will not recur.'
The second lesson to be learned from the Cairo experience is that
continued federal funding must be available for legal services programs
free from political and local control. The Cairo lawsuits would not have
been filed under a judicare system operated by local attorneys or under
a legal services system administered or otherwise controlled by the
local bar or politicians. Although the Lansden brothers fought many
courageous battles on behalf of civil rights as private attorneys, they
did so at a price few other lawyers would be willing to pay. 1 42 Furthermore, part-time legal aid lawyers with private practices could not maintain the caseload handled by the Cairo office, which kept a minimum of
143
three attorneys busy full-time.
CONCLUSION

When the Lawyer's Committee arrived in Cairo in 1969, the community was being destroyed by racism and violence. The Committee was

able to channel the grievances of black citizens into the courts. For those
who believe that litigation is an effective alternative to street fighting.
the strategy of the Lawyer's Committee must be regarded as a success.
The lawsuits initiated by the Lawyer's Committee, and its successor.
140 In fact, racial discrimination is best demonstrated by proof of a long-term
pattern and practice of racial bias, and by connecting current action with that longterm pattern. See, e.g., White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Furthermore, focusing on purposefulness tends to turn a lawsuit into a personal
vendetta. Plaintiffs cannot succeed showing that defendants' actions are wrong by
demonstrating an objective discriminatory effect; rather, plaintiffs must show
that defendants are bigots, and thus defendants' actions are wrong a fortiori. If
the purpose of a lawsuit is to open a dialogue between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the dialogue will be furthered by focusing on objective criteria and not
upon that particular motivation which may have inspired the defendants' conduct.
The Cairo lawsuits were most successful when plaintiffs and defendants each
thought they had won something. The recent Supreme Court decisions requiring
proof of discriminatory intent are more likely to promote dissension than to draw
people together. See R. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND I-MMORAL SOCIETY 248-49

(1960).
41

See 0. Fiss. THE CiVrL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).
142 See notes 9 & 16 supra.
143 In 1975, the office was assigned a fourth attorney under the Reginald Heber
1

Smith Program. Even with four attorneys there were few evenings or weekends
that the attorneys did not work. The serious abuses that occurred in Cairo necessitated that at least one attorney be "on-call" at all times in case of disorder.
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the Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation, largely achieved the
limited goals sought.
This is not to say that all is well today in Cairo- the community continues to contend with the twin legacies of poverty and racism. Though
the lawsuits have not reversed economic stagnation in the community,'" they have established the framework for an ongoing dialogue.
If this dialogue continues and if the community can forget old antagonisms, the future need not be as bleak as past events would seem to
portend.
Lawsuits have made a difference in Cairo. They have not produced
a color-blind society, but they have helped blacks participate equally in
society. Those who would disparage "judicial activism" or the ability
of law to effect social change only need look to Cairo and consider the
alternatives.
144 In the long run, it is possible that harmonious interracial relations will
encourage business to locate in Cairo, or at least that businesses will no longer
shy away from Cairo because of fears of racial turbulence. Cairo need not be "a
grave uncheered by any gleam of promise." C. DICKENS, supra note 1, at 185.
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